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themselves, many governments make peri-
odic if not sustained efforts to crack down on 
illegal shanties and fi nd alternative housing 
options for the poor. The squatters, however, 
tend to creep back, causing shantytowns to 
persist.
This paper takes up the interaction between 
squatters and the state by beginning with the 
question: what happens when an exception-
ally strong state takes on an especially rapid 
expansion of squatter settlements? There is 
reason to expect an effective state to have the 
resources to limit illegal housing practices, 
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Abstract
What happens when an exceptionally strong state takes on an especially rapid expan-
sion of squatter settlements? A dramatic struggle of such proportions—between 
the forces of fast industrialisation pulling rural people into the city and an effective, 
modernising state intolerant of squatting—was played out in Seoul, South Korea, in the 
1960s and 1970s, when that city was one of the world’s fastest-growing metropolises. 
This paper documents battles over unlicensed housing in Seoul and fi nds that leaders 
repeatedly failed in their endeavour to clear the city’s shantytowns, despite the 
impressive coercive capacity of the South Korean state. Instead, the state was forced 
to accommodate other interests, including industrial employers, more-privileged 
urban residents, land investors and squatters themselves. The remarkable case of Seoul 
offers insight into broader questions about the politics of housing the urban poor in 
the developing world.
Leaders in the developing world commonly 
lament the perceived social ills that accom-
pany rapid urbanisation. One of the most 
visible of these ‘ills’ is the expansion of make-
shift housing settlements. The magnitude, 
intractability and ubiquity of squatting in 
cities across the Third World—from Lima’s 
barriadas to Istanbul’s gecekondu and 
Mumbai’s chawls—can leave the impression 
that these cities are simply destined to be 
teeming with shantytowns. Seeing these 
settlements as inhumane for their inhabitants, 
disgraceful to the nation or dangerous for 
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but there is also reason to expect that very 
fast urban growth would create more severe 
obstacles to measures taken against squatter 
settlements. Does intense social change 
overwhelm government, as seems to be the 
case in parts of the world with both less quick 
urbanisation and less effective governments? 
Or does a high coercive capacity enable a state 
to stamp out unlicensed housing?
This dramatic struggle—between the forces 
of fast industrialisation pulling rural people 
into the city and a highly coercive, modernis-
ing state—was played out in the shantytowns 
of Seoul, South Korea, in the 1960s and 1970s. 
At the time, Seoul was one of the world’s 
fastest-growing metropolises. In the 1950s, 
South Korea had been an overwhelmingly 
rural country, as well as an agricultural one; 
by 1980, only one-third of the labour force 
was employed in agriculture while over half 
the population lived in cities. The South 
Korean capital’s population surged from less 
than 2.5 million in 1960 to over 8 million 
just two decades later. As industrial work 
and the promise of high wages pulled labour 
out of agriculture and into Seoul, formerly 
rural migrants found homes for themselves 
in illegal shacks. Shanties covered Seoul’s 
hills and clustered along the city’s streams, 
sheltering a good portion of the city’s low-
income inhabitants.
Seoul’s shack-dwellers found themselves 
pitted against an authoritarian state run by 
leaders who saw no place for shantytowns in 
the capital of a modernising nation. If any state 
in the developing world had the capacity 
to redirect squatters, it would be the South 
Korean. These two decades of South Korea’s 
fastest urbanisation coincided with rule by 
the former military man Park Chung Hee 
(1961–79). The literature on South Korea’s 
developmental state has emphasised how 
the state’s tremendous power enabled it to 
harness financial resources coercively for 
national development. The nation’s leaders 
themselves believed that they could guide 
urban development just as they were doing 
for economic growth. Seoul’s mushrooming 
shantytowns became a source of concerns 
about public health, social order and the ap-
pearance of the city. City and national gov-
ernment agencies made efforts to limit the 
size of squatter settlements, and sometimes 
to eliminate them entirely, through policies 
that included demolition and relocation 
as well as public housing schemes.
This paper documents the twists and turns 
in battles over unlicensed housing in Seoul 
and fi nds that leaders repeatedly failed in 
their endeavour to clear the city’s shantytowns, 
despite the impressive coercive capacity of 
the South Korean state. Why? The explanation 
developed here centres on competition be-
tween the state and powers outside the state 
that were also vying to shape the place of the 
urban poor in the city. In the process of im-
plementing policies, the state found itself 
forced to accommodate other interests, in-
cluding industrial employers, more-privileged 
urban residents, land investors and the squat-
ters themselves. This examination of responses 
to squatter policies in Seoul yields insight 
into the limits of endeavours to wipe out 
unlicensed housing, but also, more broadly, 
into questions about the state’s reach in the 
industrialising world and its role in guiding 
urban development.
The next section of the paper elaborates 
on the central question by outlining oppos-
ing expectations for the effects of state pro-
grammes to reduce unlicensed housing. The 
following two sections introduce Seoul’s 
shantytowns and the government’s reasons 
for wanting to demolish them. The core of 
the paper lies in the next four sections, which 
examine responses to policies on unlicensed 
housing as they evolved through the 1960s 
and 1970s. The final section before the 
conclusion places the analysis in a theoretical 
context and draws out lessons from the case.
 UNLICENSED HOUSING IN SEOUL  369
Unlicensed Housing and the 
State: Some Expectations
For observers of urbanisation in the develop-
ing world, it is unsurprising if rapid urban 
population growth, like that experienced by 
Seoul, leads to the expansion of shantytowns. 
There is also little surprise if leaders unsym-
pathetic to squatters fi nd that demolishing 
their settlements does not work as a perman-
ent solution and that building public housing 
is too expensive. Since the late 1960s, scholars 
of housing policy have pointed out problems 
with policies that seek to limit informal hous-
ing. John Turner and others noted that squatt-
ing provides a cheap solution to the housing 
needs of the poor, while public housing pro-
jects are too expensive for most governments to 
implement extensively (Mangin, 1967; Turner, 
1970; Ward, 1982). From this perspective, gov-
ernments are advised to tolerate makeshift 
housing and, if possible, to encourage residents 
to make improvements to their units through 
legalisation or sites and services schemes. If 
urbanisation is rapid, all the more reason to 
expect a proliferation of shanties that, however, 
detrimental to public health and to the urban 
landscape, would solve the basic housing needs 
of large numbers of low-income families far 
more cheaply than the state could. Yet what if 
a government is bent on fi ghting unlicensed 
housing and possesses a coercive capacity vir-
tually unmatched in the Third World? Might 
that sort of government have some success 
at driving out squatters? The policy-oriented 
literature on self-help housing is less useful 
here, because the concern in that body of work 
is more with suggesting better strategies than 
with explaining the effects of unadvisable 
policies.
Another approach to the issue can be found 
in schools of thought focused more directly 
on the politics of development. Samuel 
Huntington (1968), for example, suggests one 
possible link between rapid social change, of 
which urbanisation is one component, and 
political order. In Huntington’s view, quick 
social transformation, by mobilising new, 
discontented groups for political action, is 
destabilising to the extent that its pace out-
strips the expansion of political institutions. 
Through this lens, not only are the diffi cul-
ties of nascent political structures in develop-
ing countries to control low-income housing 
expected, but those governments with greater 
capacity should be commensurately better 
able to deal with those challenges. A well-
institutionalised state, then, should do better 
at accomplishing tasks (such as evicting squat-
ters) than a less-institutionalised one. Another 
body of work on state–society relations in the 
Third World argues that, beyond rapid social 
change, there are plenty of reasons to expect 
the state to have diffi culty penetrating society 
(Migdal, 1988; Migdal et al., 1994). Traditional 
leaders may maintain a degree of power over 
segments of the population, thereby under-
mining or transforming central state rule. In 
this framework, the ‘strong’ Third World state 
is the exception. And South Korea under Park 
Chung Hee was just such an exception.1
South Korean politics in this period is 
usually characterised as being a top–down 
exercise. Without seriously competitive elec-
tions, the country’s leaders were hardly 
vulnerable to pressure from social groups. 
Justifi ed by the persisting source of insecurity 
across the border in North Korea, South Korea 
boasted the world’s sixth-largest military 
and the state used a portion of it to control 
its own citizens. The literature on the South 
Korean political economy has emphasised the 
signifi cance of the state’s coercive capacity 
in explaining the country’s quick economic 
growth (Woo, 1991; Evans, 1995; Kohli, 2004). 
Linked to big business but otherwise insulated 
from society, South Korea’s developmental 
state was able to play a big role in promoting 
industrialisation. The state’s tremendous 
capabilities were felt in areas beyond the econ-
omy. Organised labour was kept in check in 
the 1960s and 1970s, through co-optation 
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of leaders and suppression of labour unrest. 
Student activism was stifl ed. The state also 
worked to manage many aspects of ordinary 
life, down to the length of men’s hair and the 
shortness of women’s skirts. Seoul was host to 
a large police presence, with curfews and high 
police discretion. Given the South Korean 
state’s record in shaping major fi nancial fl ows 
and in suppressing political resistance, it seems 
reasonable to expect that government could 
exert a signifi cant degree of infl uence on the 
housing choices of the poor residents of the 
capital’s shantytowns, who lacked formal 
organisation and grassroots leadership. 
Seoul’s shack-dwellers were, after all, quite 
weak relative to the state.
The remarkable case of Seoul, where rapid 
shantytown growth was pitted against a 
merciless and effective state, can offer insight 
into broader questions about the politics of 
housing the urban poor in the developing 
world. There are reasons to expect urban ex-
pansion to trump authoritarian power, but 
also reasons to expect the opposite. Is squ-
atting a practice that is simply too tough for 
governments to root out, regardless of their 
resources? When faced with tremendous 
social change, are there limits to what even a 
strong state can do? Seoul’s experience, because 
of the extremes involved, can contribute both 
to debates about the extent of state power in 
the Third World and to understandings of the 
possibilities for governmental control over 
unlicensed housing.
The Growth of Seoul and its 
Shantytowns
Until the 1960s, South Korea was overwhelm-
ingly agricultural. With the take-off of 
industry, labour poured out of farming and 
into the manufacturing and service sectors. 
The distribution of the labour force across 
sectors underwent tremendous change over 
two decades, as the proportion employed in 
agriculture plummeted from over 80 per cent 
in 1958 to only 34 per cent by 1980 (Table 1). 
Per capita income skyrocketed from a mere 
US$92 in 1961 to US$1674 in 1980.
South Korea’s economic transformation 
attained geographical expression in a shifting 
of the population from rural to urban areas. 
The farm economy failed to keep pace with 
other sectors and rural industry never re-
ceived the investment it would have needed 
to fl ourish. In fact, industry in the period was 
increasingly concentrated in urban places. 
Those factors meant that urbanisation rates 
were closely linked to industrialisation rates. 
A largely rural country in 1960, with 28 per 
cent of the population living in urban areas, 
South Korea was mostly urban by 1980, 
when cities were home to 57 per cent of the 
population (Table 2). Most of this change 
in population distribution came from net 
migration from villages to cities. The 1960s 
and 1970s formed the core period of South 
Korea’s urban transition, as rural-to-urban 
movement rates attained levels that would 
not be reached in later decades.2
Migrants could choose their destinations 
from among a few smaller industrial cities, 
but in the 1960s and 1970s the capital received 
Table 1. Labour structure transformation in 
South Korea (percentages)
1958 1965 1970 1975 1980
Agriculture 82 59 50 46 34
Industry 5 10 14 19 23
Services 14 31 35 35 43
Source: calculated from Kyo˘ngje kihoekwo˘n 
(various years).
Table 2. Urban levels in South Korea 
(percentages)




28 32 41 48 57
Source: World Bank (various years).
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over half of all net rural-to-urban migration. 
Seoul’s status as commercial, industrial, cul-
tural and administrative centre attracted 
people from around the country. In these two 
decades, the capital’s rate of population expan-
sion reached its peak. The city continued to 
grow in the 1980s, but growth rates showed 
decline through that decade (Table 3). By then, 
fewer potential migrants were left in the 
villages and Seoul residents themselves began 
moving to the suburbs lying beyond the city 
proper.
Rapid growth of the city’s population, 
especially of formerly rural industrial and 
service workers, brought expanded demand 
for cheap housing. Seoul’s burgeoning popu-
lation of low-income residents found homes 
in p’anjach’on, literally ‘plank villages’, named 
after the scrap material used in assembling 
their make-shift huts. Squatters put their 
shacks together from not just wood scraps, 
but also tent material, bricks, corrugated iron 
and other rubble. Shacks occupied public land 
and occasionally private land. P’anjach’on 
were home to both shack ‘owners’ and tenants, 
as the cheapest rentals were also to be found 
in the shantytowns.3 Multiple families often 
shared one shack, making them very crowded. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, Seoul’s p’anjach’on 
averaged 7.1 residents per unit.4
Many poor migrants made their fi rst step 
into the city by moving into the cheapest illegal 
housing. Particular destinations within Seoul 
depended on migrants’ contacts—relatives 
or friends from their hometown. Individual 
young adults often stayed with their contacts; 
whole migrant families moved into units 
introduced to them through their connection 
in a shantytown. Because rural people entered 
the city through this channel, 30 per cent of 
shack-dwellers had relatives living in their 
neighbourhood, even though many were far 
from their place of origin (Kim Ki-ho et al., 
1980, p. 62). This pattern of migrant settlement 
differs from models of migrant adaptation 
developed from studies of cities like Lima, 
where people moved to places close to jobs 
fi rst and then to squatter settlements as they 
established themselves (Turner, 1970). Instead, 
as my own interviews and other sources (Kim 
Cho˘ng-yo˘n, 1987, p. 47) confi rm, migrants 
to Seoul fi rst found places to stay and then 
looked for work.
Still, living in an illegal shack was not only a 
last resort. One survey of a p’anjach’on found 
that half of its households wanted to stay in 
that form of housing (Im Hu˘i-pyo˘n, 1979, 
p. 102). A shack dwelling offered a cheap 
solution to the housing needs of the poor, for 
whom price took priority over comfort.
P’anjach’on were home to a mix of migrants 
and native urbanites. They were not the 
exclusive domain of ex-farming families, but 
surveys found migrants made up well over 
half of the settlers. Those born in the country-
side ranged from two-thirds of shantytown 
residents (Kim Ki-ho et al., 1980, p. 46), to 
76 per cent (Korea Times (Seoul) [hereafter 
KT], 13 December, 1970), to 84 per cent (Ho˘ 
So˘k-yo˘l, 1982, p. 184).
Not only were many residents migrants, 
but they came from certain parts of the coun-
try. At a city-wide level, shantytowns, like all 
groupings of Seoul’s poor, were dominated 
by people from the Cho˘lla provinces in the 
south-west of the country. Cho˘lla was densely 
populated, with low levels of industrialisation 
and urbanisation. It was Cho˘lla especially that 
Table 3. The growth of Seoul: average annual population growth rates (percentages)
1960–66 1966–70 1970–75 1975–80 1980–85 1985–90
 7.6 9.4 4.8 3.9 2.9 2.0
Note: the rates are calculated from census fi gures.
Source: calculated from So˘ul t’onggye yo˘nbo (1991).
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sent young people to Seoul’s factories and 
farm families with little land were likely to 
sell what they had and move to Seoul. Surveys 
of shack areas routinely found that Cho˘lla 
people were overrepresented, while people 
from the south-eastern Kyo˘ngsang provinces 
were under-represented (Chang Tong-ik, 
1984, p. 71; Han’guk kidokkyo sahoe munje 
yo˘n’guwo˘n, 1983, p. 22; Kang Myo˘ng-sun, 
1985, p. 109; No Ch’ang-pyo˘n, 1967, p. 129). 
The composition of resident populations in 
standard housing areas offers a contrast. A 
1963 survey of a well-off neighbourhood 
found that only 54 per cent of household 
heads moved to Seoul from the countryside. 
Most non-natives hailed from North Korea, 
the Ch’ungch’o˘ng provinces, Kyo˘nggi or 
the Kyo˘ngsang provinces. Only 8 per cent 
moved from Cho˘lla (No Ch’ang-pyo˘n, 1964, 
p. 54).
Some of the most destitute shack-dwellers 
lived off the city’s trash, collecting paper 
and wood from rubbish heaps and eating 
leftovers they discovered. However, in most 
sub-standard settlements, household heads 
tended to work as simple labourers, in con-
struction or manufacturing. Shack families, 
relative to residents of standard housing, 
earned proportionally more income through 
non-household heads. One survey that com-
pared households from two different sorts 
of neighbourhood found that 91.1 per cent of 
income in the regular housing area came from 
the household head, while 82.6 per cent was 
the fi gure for the shack area. Households in 
illegal housing units mobilised family lab-
our more fully and so were more dependent 
on wives and children for their livelihood 
(Kim Ki-ho et al., 1980, pp. 76–77). Each mem-
ber’s work, however, was often temporary. In 
one neighbourhood, it was estimated that 
75 per cent of income came from temporary 
work (Whang, 1984, p. 8). Unemployment 
for long periods was less pervasive than was 
underemployment.
Government Goals and Squatter 
Policies
What did Seoul’s leaders want from policies 
on sub-standard housing settlements? Fight-
ing unlicensed housing ostensibly served 
purposes of urban beautifi cation, population 
decentralisation, freeing-up land for more 
effi cient use and preventing fi re and expo-
sure to poor sanitation. In post-war Seoul, the 
immediate goals of shack policies were to ad-
dress the risks of fl oods and fi res that plagued 
shantytowns. P’anjach’on were often built 
along waterways and so were vulnerable to 
summer fl ooding. In the dry winters, a spark 
could demolish hundreds of shacks, as the 
narrow alleys of shantytowns did not permit 
fire trucks to enter. Public hazards in the 
p’anjach’on continued to be at least a stated 
reason for demolitions throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s.
In May 1961, a clique within the military led 
a bloodless coup against the previous demo-
cratic but troubled regime. South Korea was 
soon in the hands of Park Chung Hee, who 
remained in power until his assassination in 
1979. Elections for national posts continued 
to be held but competition was not serious, 
while media and political organisations faced 
restrictions. The regime leaders—whose asso-
ciates staffed Seoul City Hall—were ambitious 
in their desire to reshape the economy and 
Korean society. From its inception, the regime 
viewed unlicensed housing as a problem for 
social order and sought to limit if not eliminate 
squatter settlements. While City Hall took the 
lead in formulating and implementing many 
housing policies, the central government was 
intensely concerned with management of the 
country’s most important city and so was never 
far away (indeed, its headquarters were just 
up the road). Central resources could readily 
be shifted to city projects. While heads of 
the other provincial-level units reported to 
the Home Minister, Seoul mayors reported 
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directly to the President as the position was 
a ministerial-level appointment. Because of 
these close links, the term ‘state’ here is used 
to refer to offi ces both within the city and 
national governments.
In the second half of the 1960s, national 
leaders expressed concern about the over-
concentration of the country’s population in 
Seoul. Policies to limit or reduce the shanty-
towns then aimed at redressing these ‘imbal-
ances’ in the national distribution of the 
population. The early 1960s plan of seeing 
the city grow to 5 million over 20 years was 
by that time clearly untenable. Meetings were 
held to discuss how the population of Seoul 
might be dispersed to the provinces. Facilities 
were to be moved out of the city and fi nancial 
incentives were to be offered for industrial 
investment outside the capital region. The 
motives behind this programme included a 
concern about unbalanced urbanisation that 
was becoming popular among planners and 
policy-makers in the developing world. Some 
worried that concentration of people and 
resources so close to the Demilitarised Zone 
separating the country from North Korea 
would be a security risk. This was especially 
the case after the January 1968 infi ltration of 
North Korean assassins, who nearly reached 
the President’s offi ce at Ch’o˘ngwadae (or, the 
Blue House).
Another concern about shack communities
—and perhaps the most deep-seated one—
was aesthetic: shantytowns made the city 
ugly, which better-off residents and City Hall 
did not appreciate. Eliminating them would 
improve the appearance of the city and, sup-
posedly, make it more modern.5 By the late 
1970s, land use issues were also wrapped up 
in shack demolition policies. Sub-standard 
housing units occupied land that was chang-
ing in value—and those considerations could 
give the city government and business great 
interest in their destruction.
Whatever the reason of the day, Seoul leaders 
in the 1960s and 1970s sought to rid their city 
of squatter settlements. Only their approach 
and the resources they devoted to that goal 
varied over time. Those approaches can be 
divided into three stages over the two decades. 
From the beginning of the 1960s until 1967, 
remedial measures were common. The gov-
ernment’s approach was to demolish shack 
neighbourhoods and then relocate residents 
to the urban periphery. Over the course of the 
1960s, policies on unlicensed housing became 
progressively more ambitious. The period 
from 1967 to 1971 was one of giant low-income 
housing projects led by offi cials who wanted 
Seoul’s appearance to refl ect the country’s 
rapid industrialisation. From 1971, policies 
became more responsive to conditions in the 
shantytowns and measures were more limited. 
Residents in designated areas would be asked 
to upgrade and offered some support, and only 
evicted if standards were not met. Whereas 
leaders in the late 1960s talked of eliminating 
all unlicensed shacks in the city, humbled 
leaders in the 1970s dealt with shacks on a 
neighbourhood-by-neighborhood basis.
Clearances and Relocation
The standard procedure for clearing shacks 
in the early 1960s was simply to tear down the 
settlements and send the evicted families to 
locations outside the city, where they might 
be provided with tents and some grain. One 
of Seoul’s most famous slums, centred around 
Ch’o˘nggye stream, saw clearances multiple 
times. Its residents were sent to sites north 
and east outside the city, and south and west 
across the river. The same method was used 
for dealing with victims of natural disasters. 
Floods left 80 000 shack-dwellers homeless in 
1965 and another 36 000 the following year. 
They were sent to tent settlements and offered 
food rations.
The need for more permanent solutions to 
the question of what to do with shack evictees 
led the state to try another method: building 
public housing for families displaced by 
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p’anjach’on clearances. In the weeks after the 
coup of 1961, thousands of illegal shacks were 
removed and the new government promised 
new housing for many of their occupants. 
By 1964, the city had some 50 000 illegal shacks 
and the possibility of demolishing them and 
housing their residents through government-
sponsored projects seemed increasingly un-
realistic (KT, 23 January 1964). Public housing 
was far from suffi cient to meet the housing 
needs of displaced shack-dwellers. Further-
more, the units turned out to be too costly 
for low-income families, who could not make 
the required downpayments (KT, 13 October 
1964). The state could not provide housing as 
cheaply as the poor, nor as well suited to their 
needs.
By autumn of 1964, City Hall was retreating 
from plans to use public housing as a major 
method of dealing with evicted shack-dwellers. 
Instead, the city would demolish unlicensed 
homes according to a fi ve-year plan and would 
address the needs of the displaced families in 
other ways. After conducting a survey of illegal 
housing units in early 1965, the city announced 
that it would demolish 6600 units in 1965, 
7700 in 1966, 8800 in 1967, 9900 in 1968, 
11 000 in 1969, 12 000 in 1970, and 15 116 
in 1971 (Yun Hye-cho˘ng, 1996, pp. 229–230). 
Over 6000 evicted households with experience 
in agriculture would be sent to reclaim land 
or to work sites. Another 17 000 would enter 
apartments. Finally, some 47 000 migrants 
from the countryside would be taken into 
detention centres (suyongso) on the outskirts 
of town (Yun Hye-cho˘ng, 1996, p. 230, fn 7).
Responses to Demolition
Squatters responded to demolitions in a 
variety of ways and at different points in the 
process of implementation. After the an-
nouncement of a plan to evict residents from 
a settlement, residents of targeted houses 
sometimes protested at City Hall. If they were 
to be evicted, shack-dwellers at least wanted 
time to prepare and preferred demolitions not 
to occur in winter.
Others sought to avoid demolition by buy-
ing off the implementers of shack policies. 
Offi cials were known to have taken money 
from squatters in return for not destroying 
their homes. In one neighbourhood, the ward 
(ku) offi ce reported that 99 per cent of 3100 
shacks had been cleared when in fact only 
40 per cent were removed. From the rest, 
offi cials took 460 000 won in bribes. Offi cials 
also engaged in the illegal sale of public land 
to squatters (KT, 20 October 1968). The city 
investigated fi ve of the city’s nine ku offi ces 
for illegally selling land designated for dis-
placed squatters to other buyers. In one list 
of sales, 20 per cent of the names did not cor-
respond to real people (KT, 29 November 
1968). It was also discovered that ‘police ir-
regularities’ had allowed 3450 restaurants 
to operate in unlicensed shacks in the city 
(KT, 7 February 1973). At one point, the city 
attempted to rein in police and offi cials whose 
loyalty was going astray by punishing those 
responsible for jurisdictions that saw the 
growth of new shantytowns.
A more widely reported response to demo-
lition attempts was physical resistance against 
demolition squads. Police and district (tong) 
administrators were charged with the work of 
carrying out demolitions. Encounters between 
p’anjach’on residents and teams of police and 
offi cials were a regular part of Seoul politics. 
As in other developing world cities, these 
scenes involved residents refusing to leave 
when bulldozers were brought in, as well as 
physical confrontation between residents and 
demolition teams. The scale of these confl icts 
varied, reaching up to 2000 residents resisting 
the efforts of some 350 police. Methods of 
eviction were often harsh. Police would arrive 
in the middle of the night, when residents were 
not expecting it and not prepared to fi ght. In 
one such case, in which residents lost, 1000 resi-
dents confronted a 300-member demolition 
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team and over 100 residents were injured 
(KT, 1 October 1968). Furthermore, they would 
bring riot police along on these nighttime 
raids (Kang Myo˘ng-sun, 1985, p. 125). Battles 
could involve residents throwing stones and 
riot police resorting to tear gas.6 It was well 
known that the police would use hired thugs 
to assist them in carrying out demolitions, 
because police on their own had diffi culty 
handling larger numbers of residents.7
By far the most pervasive response to 
shack clearances was for evictees to return 
to commercial areas in the city and rebuild 
their settlements. The plots of land given to 
shack-dwellers were located on the urban 
periphery, if not fully outside the orbit of the 
city. Work was unavailable and there were 
no means of transport back to jobs in Seoul. 
Relocation to new sites essentially had no 
value for shack-dwellers, whose subsistence 
depended on urban activity. And so they fl ed 
their tent settlements and moved back, if 
not to the same location, to other p’anjach’on 
in the city. Estimates of numbers of families 
that returned to squat in the city are rough, 
but they all suggest that this was a common 
response to resettlement. According to one 
report, 25 000 shacks were cleared in the fi rst 
three years after the coup but their inhabit-
ants had already returned to the city (KT, 23 
September 1964). Even in areas cleared after 
flooding, residents returned. One source 
calculated that, of the 64 140 households 
resettled after evictions between 1952 and 
1971, about half had moved back into the 
city because of the lack of jobs and urban 
services (Kang Myo˘ng-sun, 1985, p. 131).8
Demolitions, while involving large num-
bers of people with similar problems, did not 
provoke extensive co-ordinated responses. 
Evictions were carried out settlement-by-
settlement and any collective action was 
limited to a neighbourhood that was targeted 
at a particular time. Mostly, shack-dwellers 
responded separately to policies to wipe out 
p’anjach’on.
The Big Push to Eliminate Shack 
Dwellings
The second half of the 1960s saw the fi rst 
visible boom in the South Korean economy, 
powered in part by the biggest wave of young 
migrants from the countryside to factories in 
Seoul. The city was the capital of what was 
becoming a quickly industrialising country. 
The city’s administrators recognised these 
changes and made big plans for Seoul to 
emerge as a modern metropolis.
In spring of 1966, Kim Hyo˘n-ok, previously 
mayor of Pusan and a friend of President Park 
Chung Hee, was appointed to the top job in 
Seoul City Hall. The youthful Kim brought 
with him a vision for transforming the city 
into a more attractive and better-functioning 
place, suitable as the centre of a country on the 
move. Massive infrastructure projects were to 
be undertaken, including bridges and over-
passes, and skyscrapers were to be erected. 
Shortly after coming to offi ce, Kim declared 
in an interview that “Tearing up is my philo-
sophy” (KT, 15 July 1966). He would go on to 
be known as ‘Mayor Bulldozer’ (puldojo˘ 
sijang).
Mayor Kim’s goal was to eliminate all 
136 650 of the recorded squatter units within 
3 years. However, by chilly late November of 
the same year, Mayor Bulldozer decided that 
his philosophy would have to wait for action 
as he realised that winter demolitions would 
leave evictees out in the cold and he would 
have to face them. By January, City Hall was 
further withdrawing, turning to a plan to spare 
85 000 of the 154 000 illegal buildings that now 
stood in the city (KT, 12 January 1967).
Another wave of ambition caught City Hall 
in spring 1967. In April, the city announced 
that all illegal houses could be destroyed with-
out warning from the fi rst of May. However, 
National Assembly elections were impending 
in May and forced the city to back down on 
its squatter policies. Less than a week after the 
announcement, eight days before the election, 
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the warning was retracted and instead City 
Hall proclaimed that 150 000 illegal housing 
units would be legalised over 5 years. The 
regime did not want the masses upset as they 
went to the polls and so, during the period im-
mediately around the election, monitoring of 
shacks was lax and many people took advan-
tage of the opportunity to build. By July, the 
police found themselves confronting more 
squatters over shack removal (KT, 6–7 July 
1967). A year into offi ce, Mayor Bulldozer still 
could not start tearing down shantytowns as 
he so badly yearned to do.
Crackdown and New Measures
However, in 1967, the Bulldozer was still 
warming up. By summer of that year, City 
Hall announced a plan to build 100 000 
small houses for shack-dwellers by 1970. This 
proposal was never carried out, although it 
was transformed into another large project 
over the next few years. Spring of 1968 saw 
the city launch an assault on p’anjach’on. In 
May, there were clashes between residents 
and riot police charged with making them 
leave their homes so that they could be torn 
down. Several demonstrations were held 
by groups of hundreds of shack residents. 
Some had improved their units according 
to city guidelines and felt betrayed when the 
city told them to leave anyway. The mayor 
was seen as breaking promises made during 
the election and residents of homes marked 
for eviction called City Hall to task for it 
(KT, 12, 15 and 17 April 1968).
The Bulldozer did not back down, but 
sought to improve city control over sub-
standard settlements. He applied measures 
to make police and administrators more re-
sponsive to City Hall in their regulation of 
shantytowns. In May 1968, 44 city offi cials and 
police were fi red for taking bribes from over 
300 households in return for allowing them 
to keep their illegal homes, an arrangement 
that had persisted for at least 5 years. Now, 
when the city was cracking down on illegal 
housing, bribes were of no help in preventing 
demolition and so residents reported the 
officials and police to higher authorities 
(KT, 18 May 1968). To prevent shanties from 
reappearing, demolition teams were visit-
ing eviction sites twice per week (KT, 19 May 
1968).
The year 1968 saw much demolition, but 
the city failed to procure funds from other 
projects that were to be used for building units 
for former shack-dwellers. Those programmes 
were cancelled for the year and would instead 
begin in 1969. Meanwhile, the city continued 
clearing squatter settlements. In 1969, City 
Hall declared again that it would remove all 
the city’s shacks, this time by 1971. City and 
national government threats on administra-
tors continued as a means of ensuring that 
policies were followed through. The Home 
Minister warned that police would be pun-
ished if they failed to demolish unlicensed 
shacks (Sijo˘ng kaeyo, 1970, pp. 263–264). 
The city tried to make ku offi ces responsible 
for illegal dwellings in their jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, the city attempted to make 
shack-dwellers monitor each other, by claim-
ing that it would destroy 10 shacks near any 
one new shack. Still, these efforts had little 
visible effect, as the city’s illegal shacks 
increased from 136 000 in 1966 to 187 000 
by 1970.
Citizens’ Apartments
The Bulldozer’s landmark project was to be 
the construction of low-income housing units 
to shelter former shack families, to make 
Seoul free of shantytowns and to ‘add dimen-
sion to’ (ipch’ehwa)9 the city. The Citizens’ 
Apartments (simin ap’at’m) project evolved 
out of earlier plans to build units for evictees, 
with the decision now to build walk-up 
apartments for them rather than single-unit 
dwellings. The undertaking, planned from 
1968, was to involve building 90 000 units in 
some 2000 apartment buildings for evicted 
shack-dwellers. The apartments were made as 
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simple and functional as possible. P’anjach’on 
families were issued tickets for the units and 
each family was to make a downpayment 
followed by a series of monthly payments.
The fi rst Citizens’ Apartments were com-
pleted in July 1969 and over 2000 families 
moved in. By November, 407 buildings were 
fi nished, with 16 000 units. These units were 
designated for the families who had been 
evicted from shacks in 1968 and were still 
waiting for housing promised them by the 
city. However, one-quarter of those offered 
units were unable to move in because the city 
asked for a larger initial sum than had earlier 
been indicated. Instead, the government 
announced that the apartments of those who 
could not afford to move in would be sold 
publicly—an arrangement that saved the city 
resources, but undermined the intention of 
the project (KT, 23 November 1969).
In fact, a major issue for the Citizens’ Apart-
ments was that they ended up in the hands 
of those for whom they were not intended. 
As early as April 1969, before any units had 
opened, rights-holders were already selling 
their stakes to others. When this was dis-
covered, City Hall banned further sales of 
Citizens’ Apartment tickets to families who 
were not rights-holders. The city had little 
success in enforcing this ban. Despite being 
offered the fi rst opportunity for the apartments, 
evicted shack families were effectively priced 
out of the Citizens’ Apartments. Many could 
not afford the monthly instalments and so 
sold their tickets. Another problem was that, 
even if families possessed the wealth to make 
the downpayment, they frequently could 
not access it because of diffi culties in getting 
housing deposits back from sub-standard 
settlement landlords who had tied up their 
money in other investments. The result was 
that half to three-quarters of evictees sold 
their apartment rights to others (Lee, 1990, 
pp. 43–44).
Further surveys of Citizens’ Apartment 
residents confi rm that former p’anjach’on 
residents were not the ones who ended up in 
the new units. One research team found that 
46 per cent of families in one set of Citizens’ 
Apartments had moved in from squatter 
areas (Kim Sun-ae and Kim Hye-suk, 1972, 
pp. 77–78). Other studies compared house-
holds in Citizens’ Apartments with those in 
illegal housing units. One such study found 
that 80 per cent of the squatter households 
earned less than 30 000 won per month, while 
half of households in Citizens’ Apartments 
earned over 40 000 won each month. A much 
larger percentage of household heads in 
Citizens’ Apartments, as compared with 
p’anjach’on, were engaged in white-collar 
work (Pak Yo˘ng-ki, 1973, p. 26). Another 
found that, comparing a Citizens’ Apartments 
neighbourhood and a p’anjach’on, 59 per cent 
of households in the Citizens’ Apartments 
neighbourhood earned less than 20 000 won 
and 90 per cent of those in the p’anjach’on 
earned less than 20 000 won. Furthermore, 
42 per cent of Citizens’ Apartments residents 
were born in Seoul, compared with only 9 per 
cent in the shantytown (Pak Tong-so˘, 1970, 
pp. 114–116). The evidence suggests that the 
Citizens’ Apartments drew from a mix of the 
most successful shack-dwellers and middle-
class urban residents who had not lived in 
shacks.
After November 1969, however, no more 
Citizens’ Apartments were constructed. The 
following April, one of the buildings, the 
Wawu Citizens’ Apartment, collapsed, leaving 
33 residents dead. The Bulldozer fell with his 
project, leaving offi ce days after the disaster.10 
It turned out that City Hall had been unable to 
manage construction of the Citizens’ Apart-
ments properly. Bidding for projects had not 
been carried out in an open and honest way, 
as was the case for most projects at the time. 
Offi cials had taken bribes in exchange for 
allowing cheap, low-grade materials to be 
used. Multiple iterations of sub-contracting 
left the actual builders with insuffi cient funds 
to purchase proper materials. The remaining 
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406 apartment buildings were inspected and 
61 found to be dangerous. Plans for the re-
maining 1500 buildings were quickly scrapped 
and resources concentrated on demolishing 
or reinforcing the existing buildings.
Kwangju Housing Complex
Overzealous demolitions in 1968 and the 
preference of many squatters not to move 
into Citizens’ Apartments meant that the city 
had created a group of evictees with no place 
to go. So City Hall in 1968 procured land in 
Kyo˘nggi province, outside Seoul, and set up 
a displaced persons camp. The site was ori-
ginally to hold former shack-dwellers, up to 
48 000 households, temporarily while they 
waited for Citizens’ Apartments to become 
available. Squatters from several districts were 
rounded up, by force if necessary, and loaded 
onto trucks and taken to the camp, located at 
Kwangju.11 Settlers were offered a residence 
ticket that entitled each family to a plot of 
land, cash and one tent for every 10 families 
(Kim, 1974, pp. 70–80).
By late 1969, the camp held 15 000 former 
p’anjach’on residents. Seoul intended to in-
stall infrastructure at the site, but by winter 
there still were no services. The area had no 
job opportunities and the bus ride to Seoul 
took two hours. Some 30 per cent of the re-
settled families returned to Seoul where they 
could fi nd cheap shacks for rent and where 
they could look for work (KT, 7 December 
1969).
The tragedy at Wawu Citizens’ Apartment 
and the subsequent abandoning of the 
Citizens’ Apartments project meant that the 
government no longer had a solution for the 
former shack-dwellers at the Kwangju camp. 
A few weeks later, City Hall decided that 
Kwangju would be established as a satellite 
city. Factories, urban services and markets 
would all be set up, so that resettled families 
could make permanent homes there. By June, 
Kwangju, run as a part of Seoul although not 
in the contiguous city, had 27 000 residents 
but big problems of food, water, electricity 
and housing shortages. Resettled families 
were continuing to move back to Seoul. In the 
autumn, ground was broken for factories that 
were supposed eventually to employ 45 000 
workers (KT, 20 September 1970). Under the 
leadership of one of the Bulldozer’s deputy 
mayors, Kwangju was planned to become a 
self-suffi cient community of some 350 000 
residents by 1973. The city also planned to 
build 17 elementary schools, 13 secondary 
schools, public health centres and private 
hospitals, and set up more bus routes to Seoul 
(Kim, 1974, p. 81).
By the fi rst month of 1971, Kwangju was 
home to 70 000 residents, who were fl ock-
ing in with city investment in the area. 
The Kwangju Housing Complex (Kwangju 
chut’aek tanji) was turning into a business 
operation. Even before the announcement 
that it would be developed as a satellite city, 
wealthy people from Seoul were already 
moving in and building apartments (KT, 
7 December 1969). If the government was 
going to provide infrastructure, including 
transport to Seoul, then Kwangju suddenly 
became a great investment for well-off Seoul 
residents. Furthermore, City Hall, which still 
ran the town, attempted to utilise this interest 
in the project. The city’s strategy was to fund 
the project by selling land to developers. This 
had effects that worked against the goals of 
Kwangju. First, the city simply held onto land 
located at the town centre until prices reached 
a certain level. People from Seoul then bought 
the land, but rather than developing it, they 
too only waited for prices to rise further. The 
result was that the land to be developed into 
housing and public facilities was not used 
(Kim, 1974, pp. 85–86). The second effect was 
that land speculation priced resettled squatters 
—who were, after all, supposed to inhabit the 
town—out of Kwangju.
Industry was also not moving into Kwangju. 
While bus routes to Seoul helped commuters, 
the town lacked access to the rail and highway 
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grid that would link it to ports. By August 
1971, the town had a population of 200 000 
but its industrial base consisted of 1500 
teenage girls working in 4 factories (Kim, 
1974, pp. 90–91). Not industry but real estate 
was the major business in Kwangju. The town 
had 2000 real estate offices at one point, 
many of them operating without licences. 
The onslaught of realtors into Kwangju drove 
resettled squatters back to Seoul. In addition, 
city offi cials became wrapped up in town 
business. In July 1971, Seoul’s Kwangju chief 
took cash from land sales and fl ed.
Seoul was struggling to obtain the funds 
to develop Kwangju into a satellite city. The 
project received no national support and, by 
summer 1971, Seoul had raised only 10 per 
cent of the needed money. Fully 78 per cent 
of investment was to come from revenues 
earned from land sales (Kim, 1974, p. 96). By 
this time, it was clear that the city simply could 
not afford to make Kwangju a town for poor 
p’anjach’on evictees. Seoul needed residents 
who could fund town development. Resettled 
families were selling their housing tickets to 
better-off people from Seoul, but those trades 
did not generate revenue for the government. 
To solve this problem, City Hall declared that 
non-rights-holders who wanted to move in 
were required to make payments four times 
the basic level offered to resettled families. 
Failure to make the fi rst payments within 
10 days, the city threatened, would lead to 
arrests.
Kwangju’s new residents—middle- and 
upper-class Seoul families—responded by 
forming a negotiation committee, which 
City Hall ignored. Rebuffed, residents took 
to the streets. Their demonstration turned 
out to be one that South Korea’s riot police 
could not handle. Over 4 days in August, some 
40 000 people rioted, confronting police and 
burning patrol cars.
Seoul capitulated. The new residents were 
allowed to stay in the housing units and at 
the price offered to resettled shack-dwellers. 
Seoul extended loans to industry to move 
in and organised relief programmes for the 
town. The national government became 
involved, working to lower land prices, distri-
bute grain, reduce taxes and establish job 
centres. No more squatters would be sent 
there. The priority, instead, was to keep the 
town’s new residents, who were not former 
squatters, off the streets. Within two months, 
Seoul relinquished authority over Kwangju, 
handing it over to Kyo˘nggi province, under 
which it became a city with the name of 
So˘ngnam. The town remained part of plans 
for the development of satellite cities around 
Seoul.12
The Retreat from Intervention 
in Housing Choices: Markets 
Against State
The disasters that were the Citizens’ Apartments 
and Kwangju Housing Complex humbled 
Seoul’s leadership. Hardline measures to 
intervene in low-income housing markets 
proved ill-advised, as unexpected exchanges 
between p’anjach’on residents and their 
better-off neighbours undermined ambitious 
plans to fl atten shantytowns and move their 
inhabitants elsewhere. After August 1971, 
Seoul’s approach to sub-standard housing 
settlements was limited to tinkering on the 
margins instead of trying to reshape housing 
markets.
Self-help Schemes and Renewal
In early 1972, the city announced that it would 
not destroy any shacks constructed before 
the previous November. At that time, the city 
had taken aerial photographs, which were 
distributed to tong offi ces and used to iden-
tify shack settlements. Some 173 900 illegal 
shacks were identifi ed in the photographs 
(KT, 3 February and 12 July 1972). The city 
was now making policies that treated groups 
of shacks differently. Priority was on demo-
lishing new shacks. At the same time, 
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distinctions would be drawn between those 
older unlicensed buildings that would be 
legalised and those that would receive licences 
under certain conditions.
From 1967, an election year, Seoul did have 
a self-help scheme for unlicensed settlements. 
That election promise fell through right 
away and, soon afterwards, the city’s squatter 
policies were caught up in the Citizens’ Apart-
ments and Kwangju projects. It was not until 
the 1970s that the self-help programme be-
came an important part of the city’s strategy 
in the shantytowns. In 1973, Seoul adopted a 
housing rehabilitation programme as its pri-
mary instrument for addressing unlicensed 
shacks. Under the Housing Rehabilitation Act, 
the city planned to demolish all illegal shacks 
constructed after 1970. Another 160 000 shacks 
would be required to renovate or else face 
clearance by 1982 (KT, 24 February 1973). 
The city designated 196 redevelopment areas. 
Depending on city plans, shack-dwellers were 
offered either a mix of cash and housing loans 
in exchange for vacating their unit or licens-
ing conditional on certain improvements. In 
cases of renovation, the city was to pay 70 per 
cent of the bill and the residents 30 per cent. 
Redevelopment areas would also see improve-
ments in infrastructure and urban services.
Did redevelopment schemes help the 
city to get some control over the growth of 
shantytowns? Seoul’s published statistics, 
shown in Table 4, suggest a shrinking of the 
significance of p’anjach’on residences for 
Seoul’s inhabitants. Between 1966 and 1980, 
illegal housing units made up less and less 
of the city’s housing stock, dropping from 
37.75 per cent to 15.5 per cent.
The meaningfulness of these figures is 
limited. Seoul’s 1966 survey of its shantytowns 
was a major one and the 1966 fi gure was cited 
for several years to come. Later surveys were 
done more perfunctorily, especially because 
after 1966 shacks became a more political 
issue. Because the city was devoting more re-
sources towards eliminating shacks, statistics 
showing little progress would not be good 
for the careers of those in City Hall. In fact, 
other available figures suggest a pattern 
much less clear than the one offered by the 
city government. The city’s own aerial photo-
graphs revealed 187 554 shacks in 1970, a 
number substantially higher than the one 
recorded for 1971 (KT, 12 July 1972). Informal 
estimates of squatter units reported larger 
numbers, including 200 000 in the early 1970s 
(Kim, 2001, p. 193). Another source goes as 
high as 250 000 for the early 1970s and sees a 
big drop to between 120 000 and 170 000 by 
1981 (Ro, 1984, p. 6).
What is clear is that demolitions did not 
produce a decline in unlicensed housing in the 
1970s. Starting in 1972, the city demolished 
fewer shacks annually. While the city was 
previously tearing down around 15 000 un-
licensed units per year, in 1972 only 7000 
were destroyed (KT, 6 May 1973). Numbers 
of demolitions continued to decline the next 
year, reaching only 3500 late in 1973 (KT, 6 
November 1973). Upgrading and legalisation 
were more likely causes of decreases in the 
number of illegal shacks during the 1970s. 
Seoul’s officially recorded drop in illegal 
shacks as a percentage of all housing between 
1966 and 1971 is probably driven in large part 
by a 1970 announcement legalising all shacks 
Table 4. Illegal housing units in Seoul
1949 1960 1966 1971 1976 1980
Number of units 30 000 136 650 168 300 134 900 154 047
Percentage of housing stock 15.7 16.4 37.75 26.9 16.6 15.5
Sources: Figures for 1949 and 1960 from Lee (1990, pp. 21–22); 1966–80 from Kim (1997, p. 154).
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built before 1966 (Park, 1985, p. 260). A similar 
measure was taken in 1973 to legalise those 
constructed before 1970. Where upgrading did 
occur, a strong possibility is that government 
policies were less a cause of improvements 
than was the social mobility of squatters (see 
also Kim, 1997, pp. 154–155).
Acceleration of Land Investment
Another effect of redevelopment policies 
was to divide p’anjach’on residents. Because 
shantytowns were a mix of owner-occupants 
and tenants, policies affected families in 
different ways. For tenants, demolition on 
any conditions meant losing their homes and 
gaining nothing. For many owners, on the 
other hand, redevelopment could increase 
the value of their shacks or land and could 
even make them rich (Thomas, 1993, ch. 8). 
The city would take away a portion of the 
land, sell it to speculators and in that way fund 
investment in services to the site. According 
to one calculation, land was worth on average 
5.8 times more after redevelopment than 
before (Kim, 1997, p. 128). As redevelopment 
made shantytown land more valuable, a 
portion of shack-dwellers were evicted from 
settlements designated for renewal. One re-
searcher in Seoul in the 1980s found that the 
squatters who were most active in national 
politics favoured pro-regime candidates, 
because their future depended on the gov-
ernment party carrying out its urban redevel-
opment plans (Thomas, 1993, pp. 216–217).
Rising land prices proved a central force 
determining the course of shack upgrading. 
In the 1970s, real estate became a booming 
industry in Seoul. In 1961, Seoul had approx-
imately 2000 realtors, most of whom were 
elderly men who served as middlemen on 
housing transactions and played that role as 
a hobby. Sitting at tables in alleyways, they 
would keep abreast of families desiring to 
move in and out of the neighbourhood and 
arrange deals for a small 2 per cent commission 
from each side. Ten years later, real estate had 
transformed from a pastime of old men to a 
big-budget industry, run largely by middle-
aged women. Redevelopment policies were 
very much informed by the rise of wealthy 
people’s interest in investing in land.
The trend of greater investment in land 
affected other policies on shack-dwellers, too. 
Despite the lessons of the Citizens’ Apart-
ments, the city was back planning public 
housing projects for evicted shack-dwellers 
in 1973. City Hall started procuring land for 
apartments for these families. Another stra-
tegy to house evictees was to allocate portions 
of apartment buildings for them. In 1975, the 
apartment construction craze began and vast 
apartment complexes started sprouting up 
south of the Han River, which runs through 
Seoul. In the Chamsil Apartments, among 
the most famous of the early communities, 
the city demanded that 12 250 units be set 
aside for shack-dwellers (KT, 18 June 1975).
In the mid 1970s, the efforts both to build 
low-income apartments and to reserve apart-
ments units for former shack-dwellers were 
undermined by middle- and upper-class 
demand for land and housing. In 1975, the 
government was failing to purchase land on 
the outskirts of the city for apartments for 
those left homeless by urban renewal. Even 
far from downtown, land prices reached levels 
that were two to three times the amount set 
aside for procuring land for the low-income 
housing projects (KT, 5 June 1975). Plans for 
apartments in the satellite cities of Inch’o˘n 
and Kwangju were cancelled in the same year, 
because the Construction Ministry failed to 
acquire enough land. This trend continued 
throughout the rest of the 1970s, as the city 
and national governments could not make 
landowners sell.
Meanwhile, a boom in apartment con-
struction drew everyone’s interest. Units at 
Chamsil and elsewhere were distributed 
publicly, as the national construction enter-
prise run by the Construction Ministry was 
in charge of these projects. A deposit system 
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was set up, requiring a certain amount of 
money to be put in before lots were drawn. 
Demand far exceeded the supply of units. In 
one case, 160 units drew 19 800 applications 
(KT, 10 August 1977). Applicants were using 
false names and a survey found that one-third 
of applicants were speculators (KT, 25 June 
1977). The Construction Ministry tried to fi ght 
speculation by banning the resale of units 
for certain periods of time, but that measure 
seemed to have little effect. The apartment craze 
hit a peak in summer of 1977, when fi ve fi rms 
opened new apartment complexes during six 
weeks. Deposits from the 40 500 applicants 
tied up 4.6 per cent of the nation’s money 
supply (KT, 12 August 1977).
The opportunity for easy earnings from 
apartment sales attracted big business and 
government as well. The conglomerates 
started turning to apartment construction 
in this period. Furthermore, even as the state 
moved away from public lotteries for hous-
ing, government offi cials were found to have 
taken large cuts from apartment sales. In 
1978, 220 high offi cials were found to have re-
ceived favours related to apartments. Seoul’s 
deputy mayor and housing management 
chief were both arrested for scandals involv-
ing apartments. The interest of big business, 
individuals in government and middle- and 
upper-class residents in Seoul’s new apart-
ments meant that former shack-dwellers, 
who were supposed to receive priority for a 
portion of units, were squeezed out. Evicted 
p’anjach’on residents could not afford units in 
the new apartments. Even with government 
support, too many other big players were 
ready to make them offers for any units for 
which they had priority. Housing markets 
trumped the state.
Towards Industrial Maturity: 
Market Joins State
The forces of land speculation that grew 
in the 1970s pushed shantytown battles in 
another direction by the 1980s. The rising 
value of land, caused in part by urban renewal, 
eventually forced squatters entirely out of 
major parts of Seoul. The interests of the state 
in limiting p’anjach’on growth converged with 
those of business, whose attitude towards 
sub-standard settlements reversed. By the 
1980s, those with money wanted the land that 
squatters occupied and backed state efforts 
to evict them. With renewal, the state could 
dispossess the squatters and make revenue 
from developers. While earlier squatter 
policies were motivated by concerns about 
city appearance, unproductive land use and 
disorder, in the 1980s the private concerns 
of investors triumphed over public ones. As 
has been seen, private interests were key in 
shaping the effects of state policies on 
squatters. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, 
those interests worked against state goals for 
squatters. By the 1980s, the state was working 
with business and better-off residents against 
the p’anjach’on.
Seoul had made the transition out of an 
early stage of industrialisation and that 
transformed the housing options of the 
city’s poor. The land occupied by squatters 
increased in value to such an extent that com-
mercial interests demanded it be used for 
other purposes. As one observer has noted
Those with fi nancial resources could change 
the poor housing areas. Those who could 
not afford the high prices of renewed areas 
and the housing-related savings have been 
excluded from their existing houses and from 
new housing markets (Kim, 1997, p. 165).
Marginal housing was a decreasingly viable 
option for the poor.
Space for offi ces was now more valuable 
than having a cheap, unskilled labour sup-
ply in the city. That revolution made housing 
politics in the 1980s different from what 
came before. Farm families that had moved 
to Seoul’s slums and had helped build the city 
were cleared out of their homes and offi ces 
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were built in their places.13 South Korea’s 
exit from a phase of labour-intensive indus-
trialisation found markets fi nally joining the 
state against the forces that brought rural 
migrants into informal housing settlements 
downtown.
Explaining Battles Over 
Unlicensed Housing
Why did Seoul’s leaders not succeed in their 
goal to reduce unlicensed housing in the 
1960s and 1970s? The fi ndings are not readily 
explained by major schools of thought on 
the politics of the poor in the developing 
world. Neo-Marxist writings highlight the 
marginalisation of the urban poor through 
the collaboration of business and state, which 
together squeeze labour out of them while 
ignoring their basic welfare (Burgess, 1982, 
pp. 64–68; Castells, 1983, pp. 209–212). South 
Korean scholars in the 1980s became fond of 
these logics of dependent development and 
their implications for the poor (Yi Tae-ku˘n 
and Cho˘ng Un-yo˘ng, 1984; Pak Hyo˘n-ch’ae 
et al., 1985; Lim, 1985). Yet, as the narrative 
illustrates, the state and capital often worked 
at cross-purposes in the low-income housing 
sector. While the state poured resources into 
moving squatters out, business wanted the 
cheap labour pool to remain in the city and 
gave p’anjach’on-dwellers incentives to stay. 
To be sure, the welfare of the urban poor was 
not a central concern of either the state or 
capitalists, but their divergent interests re-
garding shantytowns pitted them against each 
other. Only when demand for urban land 
outstripped interest in low-skill labour did 
businesses change their stance.
Civil society is another actor that receives 
attention in writing on the urban poor. In 
this model, organised expression of interest 
through lobbying, spreading awareness or 
protesting is the centre of struggles over in-
formal housing. For example, observers of 
Bangkok’s poor have written about the efforts 
of civic groups made up of squatters and their 
allies to protest against evictions in that city’s 
slums (Ockey, 1997; Missingham, 2002). In 
discussions of the lower social strata in South 
Korea, arguments with a similar analytical 
focus have been made. In his political history 
of Korean labour, Hagen Koo (2001) traces 
the rise of labour activism from grassroots 
organisation in the 1970s. Alliances between 
labour and students and church activists are 
seen as key motors of South Korean political 
change in this perspective. In the housing 
sector, this perspective would point to resist-
ance to oppressive housing policies. In fact, 
though, organised resistance remained min-
imal. Protests were localised to particular 
neighbourhoods and articulate civil society 
did not emerge in this sector until after the 
period under discussion.
Could the failure to eliminate informal 
housing have been caused by the methods 
chosen and bureaucratic procedures fol-
lowed to pursue that goal? Certainly, there 
were administrative problems, as seen in the 
sad end to the Citizens’ Apartments project. 
More fundamentally, however, the city’s 
shortcomings appear to have originated in 
problems of power rather than of policy. 
Diffi culties arose from City Hall’s shortage 
of resources relative to other interests, rather 
than from the particular tools employed to 
achieve government ends. Any policy support-
ing government goals would have required 
resources and would have put city leaders up 
against others with more resources.
The dynamics of the Seoul case are better 
captured by conceiving of the politics of 
informal housing in terms of competition 
between the state and non-state powers to 
shape the city.14 Squatter policies in Seoul 
engaged not only government and squatters, 
but also other powerful groups. Urban em-
ployers, land and housing investors, and 
better-off urban residents all weighed in on 
government policies, shaping the housing 
options of low-income residents. Their 
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reactions were largely inspired by market 
forces, in particular markets for industrial 
labour, cheap services, housing and land. The 
ensuing competition between the state and 
the market occurred not in the process of 
formulating policies, but in response to their 
implementation. Even though policy-makers 
could remain relatively insulated from the 
demands of squatters—or of other interests, 
for that matter—when policies were enacted, 
these groups responded in ways that often 
hampered the policies. The outcomes of these 
confl icts are better understood if the strategies 
employed by the city are broken down and 
responses to them are examined separately.
Over the 1960s and 1970s, city and national 
leaders attacked Seoul’s squatter settlements 
through a two-pronged strategy. Demolition 
measures made up one component. The other 
was to provide alternative housing options, 
which encompassed resettlement projects, 
public housing programmes and the desig-
nation of apartment units for evicted shack-
dwellers. Clearance and supply of alternatives 
were not always pursued in a balanced way, 
but throughout the two decades both were 
employed to try to alter the housing choices 
of Seoul’s poor. Each strategy faced its own 
set of challenges, particularly in the way more 
privileged groups interfered in government 
plans.
The effects of demolitions were shaped 
especially by the interest of employers and 
middle-class urban residents in clearing or not 
clearing the city of shack residents. Shanty-
towns allowed the city to sustain an unskilled 
labour pool, which offered its energy to 
industrialists at low cost and provided cheap 
services to other Seoul residents. Demand 
from those groups pulled rural people into 
informal housing in the city and gave them 
incentives to keep returning when their homes 
were destroyed and to prevent eviction by 
paying bribes to administrators. Those forces 
overpowered government capacity to monitor 
rebuilding and permanently to clear sub-
standard settlements. Only when business 
interest in urban land for offi ce space rose 
suffi ciently could the state fi nd support to 
clear shantytowns effectively.
Attempts to offer alternative forms of 
housing were infl uenced particularly by the 
relationship between government and pri-
vate fi nanciers of real estate development. In 
project after project, city leaders faced a dil-
emma over how to fund housing for evicted 
shack-dwellers: if administrators endeav-
oured to draw exclusively on public funds, 
they lacked the resources to make effective 
policies; if they sought resources from others, 
the projects themselves were altered. The cost 
of public housing made it impossible to meet 
the needs of large numbers of families who 
had very limited money to spend on shelter. 
Thus public housing projects in the fi rst half 
of the 1960s ended up being small or scrapped 
altogether. The other option was to turn to 
others for help in fi nancing housing for the 
poor. Pursuing that course, however, resulted 
in undermining the very objectives of the 
projects. When more privileged residents or 
investors bought up units intended for former 
squatters, government fi nances were better 
off but the intended recipients returned to 
the shantytowns. Even when the city invested 
heavily in an alternative for shack-dwellers, 
as in the development of the Kwangju com-
plex, that very investment attracted private 
commercial interests. Once projects became 
profi t-oriented ventures, the poor were driven 
out. In the 1960s and 1970s, Seoul leaders 
were unable to overcome this dilemma.
When the South Korean economy matured 
and migration to Seoul slowed, shantytown 
politics changed fundamentally. As unskilled 
labour became less important to business and 
land became more valuable, market and state 
came closer to a congruence of interests. Those 
changes suggest that the state’s struggle against 
the market in the low-income housing sector 
 UNLICENSED HOUSING IN SEOUL  385
may be particular to an early phase of indus-
trial development. From the Seoul evidence, it 
might be postulated that government success 
in shaping low-income housing systems is 
inversely related to the urban demand for 
low-skill labour. Such a relationship would 
mean that governments would have more suc-
cess clearing unlicensed housing when a city 
is at very low levels of industrial development, 
less success when industrialisation gains 
speed and greater success again when the 
economy becomes more fully industrial and 
more dependent on skilled labour and white-
collar manpower. This conjecture would imply 
that rapid industrial growth makes commer-
cial forces—and not the state—more infl uen-
tial in urban development. If further evidence 
supports this claim, leaders in low-income 
countries should be aware that the process of 
getting rich comes with the cost of sacrifi cing 
a degree of discretion over how cities develop. 
Or, phrased more positively, they should 
prepare for the diversity of housing solutions 
that economic growth brings to cities.
Conclusions
What, then, of the famed strength of South 
Korea’s mighty developmental state? It turns 
out that managing industrial development 
and steering the housing choices of hundreds 
of thousands of poor families are two very 
different tasks, each demanding particular 
sorts of power. South Korea’s developmental 
state, while good at directing centralised re-
sources like big business and formal fi nance, 
proved less effective in guiding the housing 
choices of Seoul’s poor during the peak de-
cades of the country’s urban transition. The 
giant projects of the late 1960s and early 
1970s to eliminate informal housing refl ect 
the confi dence of a government that was pro-
ving to have the resources to manage quick 
economic transformation and that expected 
social transformation could be accomplished 
with similar tools. Yet while the state was 
quite strong in one sector, it fell fl at in the 
other.15 Leaders could make deals with banks 
and big business, but had a harder time sur-
veilling shantytowns, preventing reconstruc-
tion, building affordable public units and 
controlling land prices. Even in authoritarian 
contexts, it is important to have a differenti-
ated understanding of state power.
Are we to conclude that squatting is an 
intractable issue in developing world cities 
and that drastic measures to eliminate it are 
doomed to failure? If South Korea’s military 
leaders could not eliminate informal settle-
ments, does that mean that states of less 
impressive capacities will also be unable to 
do so? Subtler, less ambitious policies might 
well have a greater impact on the low-income 
housing system, but a clear lesson of this study 
is that a strong state cannot simply muscle 
through a transformation of the housing 
options of the urban poor. This conclusion 
goes beyond the arguments of the self-help 
perspective by pointing to another cost in 
attempting to eliminate shack settlements. 
Even for leaders who ignore the advice of the 
self-help camp, anti-squatter policies prove 
costly because they pit governments against 
other forces with interests in shack residents 
and in expanding their housing choices. 
Mass evictions and giant alternative housing 
schemes are not simply inadvisable policy 
choices; they are accompanied by political 
battles once chosen. Willingness to invest 
in clearing shanties is not enough to make 
that happen, because those policies incur 
responses from groups that compete with 
the state to shape urban development. Even 
governments with impressive capabilities, 
like the South Korean, are challenged in those 
struggles.
Conflicts over shantytowns were ultim-
ately battles for control over what kind of city 
Seoul would be—who could live there, how 
the housing system would be organised and 
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where the poor would fi t in the city—and the 
government did not win. The city’s develop-
ment was shaped instead by the interacting 
interests of employers, middle-class house-
holds, land markets and the poor themselves. 
Those interests created a formidable force 
against the state’s goals of creating a ‘modern’ 
city. Eventually, in the 1980s and later, Seoul’s 
unlicensed housing settlements have been 
variously upgraded and demolished, as the 
interests of business and the state have shifted, 
modes of political engagement have changed 
and the fortunes of one-time squatters have 
improved. Home to vast stretches of high-rise 
apartments, up-scale shopping centres and 
effi cient public transport, as well as pockets of 
poverty, Seoul today is indisputably modern, 
but the city did not get there through the 
modernist visions of its early strong men.
Notes
 1. Migdal (1988, p. 270) does, in fact, refer to 
South Korea as one of the developing world’s 
few “strong states”.
 2. In the 1950s, South Korean rural-to-urban 
migration rates were in fact higher than in the 
following decade, as the population adjusted 
to the demographic effects of the Korean War 
(1950–53) and to the destruction of Seoul (in 
1950). By 1960, most war-related migrations 
had been completed.
 3. ‘Renting’ here, and throughout the paper, 
refers to cho˘nse arrangements, the most com-
mon form of rental in South Korea. Rather 
than paying a monthly rental fee, tenants 
would pay a lump deposit that would be re-
turned upon vacating. Paying in part with 
rice from the family farm was also common 
at this time. The origin of cho˘nse—which still 
dominates Seoul’s rental market—is unclear, 
but the practice exposes tenants to risks of 
inflation and of landlords’ not returning 
their deposit. The lump sum often came from 
selling the family’s land at home or, especially 
in the case of sons, as a wedding gift (or en-
titlement). The system meant that even the 
poor needed to have their wealth tied up in an 
investment that produced no interest.
 4. This fi gure is the author’s calculation, based 
on numerous reports of houses destroyed and 
people left homeless from fi res in shantytowns 
over the two decades.
 5. Some non-state élites also expressed aesthetic 
concerns about shantytowns. One intellectual 
(Song, 1970, p. 17) wrote in 1970 that “Seoul 
needs a special committee on preservation and 
beautifi cation. ... Such a committee should be 
composed of artists, writers, architects, and 
other residents of the city who really care”.
 6. This was the case in a Sadang neighbour-
hood clearance. The shacks were torn down 
but appeared again three days later (KT, 12 
November 1970). This episode followed an 
initial effort in the neighbourhood by 100 
police to dismantle 300 shacks, which saw the 
shack residents successfully rebuff the police 
(KT, 8 November 1970).
 7. See, for example, a report on “extra workers” 
employed to help tear down shacks (KT, 12 
September 1967).
 8. Another observer gives the same proportion 
of returns for 70 000 households, or 330 000 
people, removed from the city between 1955 
and the mid 1980s (Lee, 1990, pp. 22–23).
 9. This term was used in city planning, including 
in Sijo˘ng kaeyo (1970, pp. 248–249).
10. Kim Hyo˘n-ok, connected to all the right people, 
did not fall far and quickly reappeared as 
Home Minister.
11. This place should not be confused with 
the more famous Kwangju of South Cho˘lla 
province, where the government fi red on 
protesters in 1980.
12. As an ironic twist of fate would have it, the 
site of the Kwangju Housing Complex became, 
by the late 1990s, an élite community of 
commercial and residential high-rises, separ-
ated from its rural surroundings by a moat. 
Now called Pundang and linked to Seoul by 
subway and expressway, space there fetches 
the highest prices in the country.
13. Most redevelopment took place after 1980. 
From 1976 to 1981, urban areas saw 66 000 
square metres redeveloped; by 1990, another 
600 000 square metres were redeveloped. 
These fi gures are national, but 95 per cent 
of urban renewal occurred in Seoul. Only 
8.4 per cent of the land redeveloped by 1990 
was used for housing; commercial purposes 
dominated (Kim, 1997, pp. 158–159).
 UNLICENSED HOUSING IN SEOUL  387
14. On the intellectual tradition that places 
confl ict between the state and other forces, 
particularly markets, at the centre of politics, 
see Polanyi (1944), Schattschneider (1960) 
and White (1997).
15. In a book on another dimension of social 
policy, Michael Seth (2002) argues that South 
Korea’s state did far less than its society to 
shape the tremendous development of the 
country’s education system. In low-income 
housing as in schooling, the state was not as 
strong as most discussions of South Korean 
politics would have one believe.
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